With our attention riveted on Libya, the AP notes that Bahrain's tensions are building, and in a manner that bodes ill, for the people of that island, for Sunni-Shia relations there and across the region, and for the US 5th Fleet, which is headquartered at Bahrain's port of Manama. The Sunni regime's security forces have been conducting night raids against Shii villages, bashing down doors and intimidating and killing locals. A revolt that started out focused mostly on issues of political rights and representation for the largely impoverished and disenfranchised Shia is moving toward sectarian conflict, potentially much more dangerous in terms of the animosities it conjures up and the spill-over into Iran's relations with Saudi Arabia.
Sectarian tensions may also be unleashed in Syria, where demonstrations erupted in several cities (including a suburb of Damascus, the ancient capital) after Friday prayers. One report mentions as many as many as four killed by the government's security forces. Again, the impetus for protest seemed to be derived at first from the tide of pro-reform and democratic demands that have welled up in the Middle East over the last few months, but mixed in is a long-simmering resentment of a Sunni-majority population against being ruled by a family that belong to the Shia-offshoot Alawi sect. The Asad regime (beginning with the current president's father, Hafez al-Asad) is Baathist, and thus, ideologically speaking, secular Arab nationalist - an ideology long associated with Sunni Arab dominance. But Syria is also home to its own Muslim Brotherhood groups, who despise the secular orientation of the Baath as well as the Alawi religious ties of the Asads. An earlier attempt by such groups to rise up against the Baath regime in 1982 in the city of Hama led to their horrible repression by Hafez al-Asad, whose forces bombarded the city and killed around 10,000 people. But these Sunni religious groups still flourish in Syria, and observers like Patrick Seale are worried that Syria will soon erupt into violence that could destabilize the region at least as much as are the troubles in Libya.
Sectarian tensions may also be unleashed in Syria, where demonstrations erupted in several cities (including a suburb of Damascus, the ancient capital) after Friday prayers. One report mentions as many as many as four killed by the government's security forces. Again, the impetus for protest seemed to be derived at first from the tide of pro-reform and democratic demands that have welled up in the Middle East over the last few months, but mixed in is a long-simmering resentment of a Sunni-majority population against being ruled by a family that belong to the Shia-offshoot Alawi sect. The Asad regime (beginning with the current president's father, Hafez al-Asad) is Baathist, and thus, ideologically speaking, secular Arab nationalist - an ideology long associated with Sunni Arab dominance. But Syria is also home to its own Muslim Brotherhood groups, who despise the secular orientation of the Baath as well as the Alawi religious ties of the Asads. An earlier attempt by such groups to rise up against the Baath regime in 1982 in the city of Hama led to their horrible repression by Hafez al-Asad, whose forces bombarded the city and killed around 10,000 people. But these Sunni religious groups still flourish in Syria, and observers like Patrick Seale are worried that Syria will soon erupt into violence that could destabilize the region at least as much as are the troubles in Libya.
Syria lies at the center of a dense network of Middle East relationships, and the crisis in that country -- which has now resulted in the deaths of well over 100 civilians, and possibly close to double that number -- is likely to have a major impact on the regional structure of power. The need to contain pressure from the United States and Israel, for decades the all-consuming concern of Syria's leadership, has suddenly been displaced by an explosion of popular protest highlighting urgent and long-neglected domestic issues.
If the regime fails to tame this domestic unrest, Syria's external influence will inevitably be enfeebled, with dramatic repercussions across the Middle East. As the crisis deepens, Syria's allies tremble. Meanwhile, its enemies rejoice, as a weakened Syria would remove an obstacle to their ambitions. But nature abhors a vacuum, and what will come will be unpredictable, at best. . . .
What is certain, however, is that what happens in Syria is of great concern to the whole region. Together with its two principal allies, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Lebanese Shiite resistance movement Hezbollah, Syria is viewed with great hostility by Israel and with wary suspicion by the United States. The Tehran-Damascus-Hezbollah axis -- of which Syria is the linchpin -- has long been seen by many leaders in the region as the lone bulwark against Israeli and American hegemony. With backing from Washington, Israel has sought to smash Hezbollah (notably through its 2006 invasion of Lebanon) and detach Syria from Iran, a country Israel views as its most dangerous regional rival. Neither objective has so far been realized. But now that Syria has been weakened by internal problems, the viability of the entire axis is in danger -- which could encourage dangerous risk-taking behavior by its allies as they seek to counter perceived gains by the United States and Israel.
If the Syrian regime were to be severely weakened by popular dissent, if only for a short while, Iran's influence in Arab affairs would almost certainly be reduced -- in both Lebanon and the Palestinian territories. In Lebanon, it would appear that Hezbollah has already been thrown on the defensive. Although it remains the most powerful single movement, both politically and on account of its armed militia, its local enemies sense a turning of the tide in their favor. This might explain a violent speech delivered earlier this month by the Sunni Muslim leader and former prime minister Saad Hariri, in which he blatantly played the sectarian card.
Cheered by his jubilant supporters, he charged that Hezbollah's weapons were not so much a threat to Israel as to Lebanon's own freedom, independence, and sovereignty -- at the hand of a foreign power, namely Iran. The Syrian uprisings may have already deepened the sectarian divide in Lebanon, raising once more the specter of civil war and making more difficult the task of forming a new government, a job President Michel Suleiman has entrusted to the Tripoli notable, Najib Mikati. If Syria were overrun with internal strife, Hezbollah would be deprived of a valuable ally -- no doubt to Israel's great satisfaction.
Meanwhile, Turkey is deeply concerned by the Syrian disturbances: Damascus has been the cornerstone of Ankara's ambitious Arab policy. Turkey-Syria relations have flourished in recent years as Turkey-Israel relations have grown cold. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, have actively sought to mediate local conflicts and bring much-needed stability to the region by forging close economic links. One of their bold projects is the creation of an economic bloc comprising Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan -- already something of a reality by the removal of visa requirements as well as by an injection of Turkish investment and technological know-how. A power struggle in Syria could set back this project; and regime change in Damascus would likely put a serious dent in further Turkish initiatives.
Turkey's loss, however, may turn out to be Egypt's gain. Freed from the stagnant rule of former President Hosni Mubarak, Cairo is now expected to play a more active role in Arab affairs. Instead of continuing Mubarak's policy, conducted in complicity with Israel, of punishing Gaza and isolating its Hamas government, Egypt is reported to be pushing for a reconciliation of the rival Palestinian factions, Hamas and Fatah. If successful, this could help defuse the current dangerous escalation of violence between Israel on the one side and Hamas and still more extreme Gaza-based Palestinian groups on the other. But Syria's internal troubles might just as easily have a negative effect.
Undoubtedly, the failed peace process has bred extreme frustration among Palestinian militants, some of whom may think that a sharp shock is needed to wrench international attention away from the Arab democratic wave and back to the Palestine problem. They are anxious to alert the United States and Europe to the danger of allowing the peace process to sink into a prolonged coma. Israeli hard-liners, too, may calculate that a short war could serve their purpose: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's far-right government may sense weakness and quietly dream of finishing off Hamas once and for all. Syria has been a strong supporter of Hamas and has given a base in Damascus to the head of its political bureau, Khaled Mashal. Turmoil in Damascus could deal Hamas a severe blow.
On all these fronts -- Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Lebanon, Palestine, Israel -- Syria is a key player. But its internal problems now threaten to reshuffle the cards, adding to the general sense of insecurity and latent violence in the region. And of all the threats facing the Middle East, perhaps the greatest -- greater even than of another Arab-Israeli clash -- is that of rampant sectarianism, poisoning relationships between and within states, and breeding hate, intolerance, and mistrust.
Several of the modern states of the Middle East -- and Syria is no exception -- were built on a mosaic of ancient religions, sects, and ethnic groups held uneasily and sometimes uncomfortably together by central government. But governments have themselves been far from neutral, favoring one community over another in cynical power plays. Many Sunni Muslims in Syria and throughout the region feel that Assad's Syria has unduly favored the Alawites, a sect of Shiite Islam, who constitute some 12 percent of the population but control a vastly greater percentage of the country's wealth. Open conflict between Sunnis and Alawites in Syria would profoundly disturb the whole region, creating a nightmare scenario for Washington and other Western capitals.
Meanwhile, Washington seems at a loss as to how to respond to the growing unrest in Syria. In tempered language, the administration has condemned the use of violence against civilians and encouraged political reform. But the undertones are evident: Stability in Syria may still preferable to yet another experiment in Arab governance. Assad will need to act quickly and decisively -- and one hopes not harshly -- to quell the rising current of dissent. Indeed, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton seemed to offer the regime some modest support this weekend, noting that she believed Bashar to be a "reformer." But reform has never been a primary goal of the Assad clan, which has long favored stability over change.
This edifice may now be crumbling, and the United States would be wise to spend a little less time thinking about Libya and a little more time thinking about a state that truly has implications on U.S. national interests. If things go south in Syria, blood-thirsty sectarian demons risk being unleashed, and the entire region could be consumed in an orgy of violence.
No comments:
Post a Comment