"America is now on the unlit, unpaved road to nowhere. "

Money quote from Paul Krugman's recent essay in the NY Times.

Washington is providing only a trickle of help, and even that grudgingly. We must place priority on reducing the deficit, say Republicans and “centrist” Democrats. And then, virtually in the next breath, they declare that we must preserve tax cuts for the very affluent, at a budget cost of $700 billion over the next decade.

In effect, a large part of our political class is showing its priorities: given the choice between asking the richest 2 percent or so of Americans to go back to paying the tax rates they paid during the Clinton-era boom, or allowing the nation’s foundations to crumble — literally in the case of roads, figuratively in the case of education — they’re choosing the latter.

Krugman unfortunately makes no mention of the drain that is Afghanistan, and Iraq, and the tons of dollars lavished on the Israeli military.

Israel's permanent insecurity masquerading as armed peace

A must-read from Paul Rogers (via Open Democracy) that highlights how Israel's actions and policies toward its neighbors guarantee a perpetually imperiled existence:

Israel has developed over the sixty-two years  of its existence into a state that is defined by conflict and the risk of war, and has learned no other way but to maintain security through overwhelming military power. It is an outlook  made possible because it can depend on a superpower’s unstinting support; it is also a recipe for permanent insecurity masquerading as armed peace (see “After Gaza: Israel’s last chance”, 17 January 2010).

A minority in Israel recognises this and advocates a different path involving negotiation and compromise; but it is very much on the margins of public debate. So dominant and powerful is the prevailing security mindset in Israel is that only pressure from external forces - in the United States , especially - could in principle induce a change of outlook. In practice, that does not seem likely - even with Barack Obama in the White House (see “America and Israel: a historic choice”, 22 March 2010).

A situation of this kind is potentially dangerous at any time; it is even more so in a period of multiple tensions across “greater west Asia” - involving Iran, Gaza, Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan. The chances of Israel waging another war in the coming months are in the balance. But a war will not release Israel from entrapment in a military doctrine that cannot deliver security, a predicament that its closest ally too is unable or unwilling to help resolve.

Jordan: It wasn't Hamas that fired rockets into Israel

Along with the incident along the Israel-Lebanon border, the recent firing of Katyusha rockets at Aqaba and Eilat has received considerable attention the last few days.  Many - including Mr. Netanyahu - have jumped to the conclusion that Hamas was responsible.  But Zvi Barel reports in Haaretz that Jordanian intelligence is pinning that, not on Hamas (and the Jordanian government is no friend of Hamas) but instead on an Islamist group (perhaps an al-Qaeda affiliate) that actually opposes Hamas' control in Gaza.

I say that Netanyahu jumped to that conclusion.  Actually, as far as he was concerned (and, I imagine, many of Israel's supporters in the US), it was a foregone conclusion.  That's a pity, because the situation is much more complicated than Hamas = Gaza = al-Qaeda.  Hamas is a movement that combines Islamism with Palestinian nationalism.  Unlike al-Qaeda, it has never attacked Americans, nor is it likely to.  But Israelis and Americans ought to keep in mind that to the extent that they revile, blockade, and weaken Hamas, they not only tear at the fabric of Gaza's society, they also help clear the way for the rise there - and beyond - of other groups, enemies of Hamas, with agendas potentially much more dangerous to Israel - and certainly more dangerous to the US.

The continuing Costs of the US occupation of Iraq

I've made the point repeatedly here that Iraq isn't "over" as far the US is concerned.  The costs will continue to be huge, as these comments from economist Linda Blimes (via the Common Ills blog) suggest:

Along with all the deaths, the Iraq War has had other costs.  "So thinking about the war in Iraq, America, you already bought it -- but do you have any of the price?"  John Hockenberry asked that question today on PRI's The Takeaway.  He and Lynn Sherr (sitting in for Celeste Headlee) spoke to economist Linda Blimes.
 
John Hockenberry:  You know, when we spoke quite awhile ago, your estimates [for the financial cost of war] were theoretical.  We're much less theoretical now.  Is there a running tally of what's actually gone out the door and -- versus what we're committed to?
 
Linda Blimes: Well I think that people are familiar with the fact that we've already spent close to a trillion dollars in real terms on combat operations in Iraq. But what is less well known is that there are still trillions of dollars of costs more that we have already incurred but not yet paid out.  So drawing down the number of troops doesn't save nearly as much money as you would think.
 
John Hockenberry:  And when you say what we're committed to, when you say trillions, is that two trillions or is that going to be six trilliion?  You know, you used plural.
 
Linda Blimes: Well when you think about the costs that we still have ahead -- There are several costs which are going to add.  We have estimated a minimum of two trillion dollars more ahead.  And first of all we should just be clear that we're still going to have 50,000 troops or so in Iraq for the next year and a half.
 
John Hockenberry:  Right.
 
Linda Blimes: And we also have troops, thousands of troops stationed in Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar and our Navy ships in the region who are not being withdrawn and who are supporting them.  So it costs billions of dollars every month just to keep them there. But there are at least five big costs that are still ahead. First of all veterans disability claims.
 
John Hockenberry:  Right.
 
Linda Blimes: And two million US troops have been deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan and already about 450,000 of those who have returned have filed for disability compensation.
 
John Hockenberry:  And that's a huge fraction.
 
Linda Blimes: I mean, that is huge fraction because --
 
John Hockenberry: It's 20%.
 
Linda Blimes: Well it's more than that because half of the troops are still deployed.
 
John Hockenberry:  There you go.
 
Linda Blimes: So it's about 40%.
 
John Hockenberry:  Wow.
 
Linda Blimes: And the vast majority of these claims will be approved and the government will be paying out benefits for many decades.
 
Lynn Sherr: And you're saying that figure is not counted in up front?  That's a -- that's a lag figure?
 
Linda Blimes: That is a lag figure, that's a good way of putting it.  That is not counted up front.  Even though we know from previous wars that the peak year for paying out disability payment comes many, many decades later.  But in this war we have fortunately a much higher survival rate, so that means we have a much higher rate of those who are wounded or for whom something happens to them during their period of service.

Exiting one quagmire; entering another?

Time's Joe Klein, on the supposed end of the US combat mission in Iraq, signing off with "Requiem for a Profound Misadventure"  as a "moment for reflection and humility in the face of a national embarrassment."  He also offers a kind of apology for his assertion, years ago, that invading Iraq might be a good thing:

The issue then was as clear as it is now. It demanded a clarity that I failed to summon. The essential principle is immutable: we should never go to war unless we have been attacked or are under direct, immediate threat of attack. Never. And never again.

Indeed.  But why, then, are the useful idiots in Congress - both Republicans and Democrats - urging Israel to launch a military strike against Iran?  Newly introduced HR 1553 signals to Netanyahu that Congress is behind him if (when?) he decided to send in Israeli bombers.  Blessedly, the resolution is non-binding, but Mr. Obama can hardly ignore it, especially with mid-term elections approaching.  (And you can also bet your bottom dollar that AIPAC and its buddies are counting on the timing here.)

Such a strike, they surely must know, will bring in the US when the Iranians respond?  And make no mistake, they will.  Please, please read today's piece ("A Cakewalk against Iran") from former CIA officer (and Ron Paul advisor) Philip Giraldi, who takes on the bomb-bomb-Iran views recently promoted by William Kristol and Reuel Marc Gerecht .  Giraldi says it plainly: an attack on Iran would be an "unmitigated disaster."

The reality is that an Israeli attack on Iran will trigger an all-out war in the region, which will quickly include the United States.  It might or might not eliminate Iran’s technical ability to build a nuclear weapon and it would almost certainly accelerate that process.  It would not bring down the Iranian regime and usher in reformers who would embrace Israel and the United States while singing "Kumbaya" around the campfire.  It would be extremely nasty, would not solve any problems in the Middle East, and would kill tens of thousands of innocent people, if not more.  It could easily lead to the use of nuclear weapons by either the United States or Israel.  For the neoconservatives, it is easy to dismiss the possible downside while emphasizing the upside that they perceive, which is protecting Israel by damaging Iran’s nuclear program and possibly bringing about some version of regime change.  But we have seen too many times in the past how the neoconservatives can be wrong — think only of the "cakewalk" that has been Iraq now seven years on and still running.  A new war in the Middle East would be an unmitigated disaster for Iran, the United States, and even for Israel.  It must be avoided at all costs.

If you need more argument to that effect, read Paul Rogers' recent report for the Oxford Research Group on the consequences of war with Iran.  (By the way, this is the same Paul Rogers who so accurately predicted - in 2002 - the disasters that an attack on Iraq might bring.)

Finally, remember that an Israel+US attack on Iran would completely put paid to any remaining shred of hope that Mr. Obama's 2009 Cairo-speech outreach to the Muslim world can bear fruit.  Indeed, it may already be too late. Laura Rozen reports on a new Arab public-opinion poll (by Shibley Telhami, an enormously well-respected expert in the area):

The most striking finding is that while early in the Obama administration, in April and May 2009, some 51 percent of those polled expressed optimism about American policy in the Middle East; in the 2010 poll, only 16 percent were hopeful, while a majority, 64 percent, were discouraged.

The data leaves little doubt that the deciding factor in the shift of opinion toward the Obama administration is disappointment on the Israeli-Palestinian issue," Telhami said by e-mail.

"Basically, Arabs have concluded that he can't deliver on his promises at best, or that he's just like Bush at worst," George Washington University Middle East specialist and ForeignPolicy.com writer Marc Lynch said. "But there's still considerable residual hope at this point that they're wrong and that he'll come through in the end."

Finally, another key finding of the poll: "a slight majority of the Arab public now sees a nuclear-armed Iran as being BETTER [my emphasis] for the Middle East."  That "slight majority" will no doubt skyrocket if Israel+USA attacks - maybe enough so that "moderates" like Mr. Mubarak in Cairo and King Abdullah in Amman will find themselves in permanent exile.

Obama's Commitment in Iraq: Is it "Ours"?

Brought to you courtesy of those America-firsters at the American Enterprise Institute, an essay from Thomas Donnelly, who assures us "America's security and economic interests in Iraq have never been greater, but Obama's commitment is uncertain . . . .  The president needs to tell his fellow Americans, too, what his post-2011 plans for Iraq are."

So, is it indeed about the oil, you good-fellas at AEI?  And is it truly the US's prerogative now to have "plans for Iraq"?  Is it ours now - and forever?

Lethal Clash at Israel-Lebanon Border - IT BEGINS. . .?

Details are still being confirmed (here's the NY Times report), it seems, with a lot of they say vs. they say, but an Israeli army mission (evidently to remove a tree - perhaps to ensure lines of fire?) into the area between the border with Lebanon and the UN Blue Line (which is in what would ordinarily be Lebanese territory) became deadly when Lebanese troops shot at them.  The IDF, as is its custom, responded with disproportionate force, following small-arms fire with artillery, followed by rockets from a helicopter that damaged a Lebanese army base.

As if tensions weren't high enough.

Tony Karon (for Time mag) was on this right away, noting that this is but one more of a series or recent events that "could be taken as signs of why many in the Middle East believe that despite the outward calm, the region may be on the brink of another catastrophic war."  He builds upon the just-published report of the International Crisis Group (Drums of War: Israel and the "Axis of Resistance"), which notes:

"The situation in the Levant is ... exceptionally quiet and uniquely dangerous, both for the same reason . . . .  The buildup in military forces and threats of an all-out war that would spare neither civilians nor civilian infrastructure, together with the worrisome prospect of its regionalization, are effectively deterring all sides." But while Hizballah and its regional backers, Syria and Iran, believe that the buildup in the Shi'ite militia's arsenal and capabilities is deterring Israel from launching attacks on any of them, Israel views the acquisition by Hizballah of a missile arsenal capable of raining destruction on Israeli cities as an intolerable threat. "As Hizballah's firepower grows," the Crisis Group notes, "so too does Israel's desire to tackle the problem before it is too late ... What is holding the current architecture in place is also what could rapidly bring it down."

Indeed.  To borrow an old expression, something's gotta give.

• You have now in Israel a leadership (best exemplified in the statements of its prime minister, Mr. Netanyahu) that has cast Iran (and , by extension, Hezbollah in Lebanon) as an "existential threat." 
• Israel has also lost its once most trusted ally in the Middle East - Turkey - in the wake of a series of provocations starting with the IDF's devastation of Gaza in 2008-2009, Israel's blockade of the Gaza Strip, and the arguably illegal IDF commando raid that killed 9 people aboard the Mavi Marmara, one of several ships trying to bring humanitarian supplies to Gaza.  (One of my readers seems to believe that these ships were trying to bring weapons to Hamas.  If anyone can point me to a report confirming that, I'd like to see it.)  Ehud Barak now fears that the Turkish military will give away Israeli military and intelligence secrets (presumably, to "terrorists" - which these days generally can be translated as any individual or group unwilling to accede to Israel's prerogative to crush whomever it sees fit to crush).  (The Turks, by the way, have now summoned the Israeli ambassador to answer for Barak's statements.)
• Finally, you have an Israeli population that (except for the courageous journalists at Haaretz and peacemakers at Btselem) has hunkered down into a posture of "the whole world hates us" combined with the mentality (that Netanyahu gins up whenever he feels the political need) of "never again."

Indeed, never again - I truly hope that we're all agreed on that.  (And I also truly believe that the vast majority of Arabs and Muslims feel that way, too.) But when will Israel realize that the Middle East has changed?  That there will be no "new Middle East" as forecast in the 1996  "A Clean Break" paper prepared for him by the emerging neocon cabal (and that was announced in 2006 by Condi Rice as being "midwifed" by the 2006 Lebanon war - even as the US stood aside to let the IDF pound Lebanon)?  That (as Niall Ferguson has recently pointed out) the US likely cannot be around much longer to back Israel's plays?

Israel needs to re-think its relationships with the world.

. . .as Pakistan burns in civil war: Pakistan's America problem

Tony Karon (in The National) writes perceptively of Pakistan's "America problem," in which regard he notes a recent piece by former CIA analyst Michael Scheuer, who claims that Washington's pressuring of the Pakistani government since 2001 has exacted a heavy price, and immersed it in a civil war:

One of the few voices in Washington that seemed to “get” the Pakistani perspective last week was Michael Scheuer, who formerly headed the CIA station charged with apprehending bin Laden. “The army’s operations have sparked a civil war between Islamabad and the tribesmen,” Scheuer wrote in The Diplomat. “For several years this struggle was confined to the tribal lands, but since 2008 it has spread into Pakistan proper, bringing repeated bombings, ambushes, assassinations and commando-style raids.”

Rather than “do more” for the US on the eve of its departure, Scheuer suggests: “For [Gen Ashfaq] Kayani and [President Asif Ali] Zardari, the time clearly has come to stop being a US proxy and to focus on halting Pakistan’s drift toward becoming a failed state. Because Washington has no clue that the services rendered it by Musharraf and Zardari caused the civil war now raging in Pakistan, Kayani and Zardari can expect nothing from Obama’s administration except demands for actions that would ultimately destroy Pakistan’s stability.”

Instead, as the US prepares to depart and looks for a political solution, the Pakistani generals will see their strategy of maintaining the Taliban as a vehicle to restore Pakistani influence in Kabul as being vindicated. Even Mr Karzai has turned to Islamabad, now – to the alarm of his Northern Alliance partners and their regional backers – looking for Pakistan’s help in securing a settlement with the Taliban. Far from putting Pakistan at greater risk, that country’s security establishment will see the US withdrawal and restoration of the Taliban to at least a share of power in Afghanistan as an opportunity to begin stabilising a very dangerous situation at home

Iraq's PM warns his critics want a weak leader

Reported by the AP's Laura Jakes.  Maliki's comments are, of course, very self-serving - but the man has a point.  There truly seems to be no strong leader waiting in the wings.

Iraq's Future even Murkier

The three-ring circus surrounding the formation of the next Iraqi government continues.  Even though his party finished second to the Sunni-backed Iraqiya party of Ayad Allawi in March, Iraqi prime minister Nuri al-Maliki, leader of the mostly Shii State of Law (Dawlat al-Qanoon) party, hoped to hang onto his premiership by allying with the other dominant Shii party, the Iraq National Alliance, which includes Muqtada al-Sadr's Sadrist trend and ISCI (Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq).  But the INA has now ended its talks with Maliki's bunch, because they evidently are insisting that he step down as PM.  At the same time, the INA probably wants nothing to do with promoting the interests of Allawi's party, which, in their minds, would be an invitation to the reviled secularist Sunni Baath party (Saddam's own) to step back into power.  Iraq's Shia could never accept that; the Kurds could not accept it either.

Meanwhile, the INA seems to have no other realistic candidate to be prime minister (at least, not one strong enough to garner much popular support).  Of course, when he came to power in 2006, Maliki was hardly seen as a strong leader.  But he grew into the job - and in the process, he emulated Saddam (and his predecessors) by creating a largely Shii security apparatus loyal to himself.  If he chooses, he could exact a bloody cost on those who might attempt to oust him from power.

The real losers, of course, are the devastated people of Iraq.  Their government, now adrift, is in no condition to actually govern - or push ahead with reconstruction.  (about which, see Stephen Farrell's piece at the NYT site today about the growing frustration over the government's - and the US's - failure to provide electricity.).  And it looks more and more as if any new government will be cobbled together in a manner that will feature a figurehead prime minister presiding over a crazy-quilt of ministerial fiefdoms designed to distribute patronage (power and money) to a political elite.

Just like under Saddam, except without the kind of strong figure Saddam was.  So much for Boy George's dream of creating a real democracy in Iraq (if that's indeed what he ever really intended).

Meanwhile, the US withdrawal is on track (says Obama) - and overdue, according to a Chatham House expert.

Wise words on Afghanistan

from Leslie Gelb, originally posted at Daily Beast, reposted to Council on Foreign Relations site.  Obama may be in the same fix that LBJ was in about Vietnam: can't win, can't get out. Obama needs to stick to his plan to start withdrawing US troops next summer - if not sooner.

Also note this excellent piece from Stephen Gray at Le Monde Diplomatique.  Money quotes:

from an unnamed NATO commander:

 Sadly for the US, almost everyone supports the Taliban rebels. Even Nato commanders. A senior officer said: “If I was a young man, I’d be fighting with the Taliban.”

From tribal elders meeting with Hamid Karzai in Kandahar:

 “If we told you what’s really happening here, we would not last the night,”

 “It’s too easy to blame the Taliban.” Shahida Hussein, a human rights activist, said the government and Nato are in league with the bad guys: “If someone kills someone, the government itself says don’t touch him, don’t bother him, he’s our friend, he’s our relative, he has a connection with us. There is no real government here. Kandahar is run by people in the drugs trade, armed with weapons and backed by foreign countries.”

The US's Iraq Dilemma

As was noted here yesterday, Iraqi deaths from political violence are skyrocketing, but the US is doing its best to put a happy-face on things - including strongly rejecting the Iraqi government's tally of the numbers killed as inflated.  As summarized by the AP's Hamza Hemdawi (in a customarily excellent report), the Iraqi says 532 killed; the US military says, nah, it was only 222.  Meanwhile, according to the AP,

at least 350 Iraqis were killed in July, but this figure is considered a minimum, based on AP reporting. The actual number is likely higher, as many killings go unreported or uncounted.

Bottom line: As the US forces withdraw and hand off security tasks to the Iraqis, Iraq's indicators are moving in the wrong direction.  As Hemdawi notes, this has implications for Afghanistan, where Mr. Obama's timeline calls for US forces to begin leaving in about a year:

The troubled transition to full Iraqi control serves as a warning for the U.S. and NATO as they pursue the same broad strategy in Afghanistan. In both countries, the war plan calls for weakening the insurgents on the battlefield while building up local forces capable of handling security while politicians pursue a political settlement.

Recent bloodshed in Iraq, where the transition is farther along, raises questions about how it will work in Afghanistan, where the challenges are far greater.

Unlike Iraq, Afghanistan has no tradition of strong central government. The country is made up of numerous ethnic groups speaking different languages with no ethnic community in the majority. Smaller groups — Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras — harbor deep grudges against the Taliban, whose support comes from the Pashtuns.

That raises the possibility that if the coalition leaves too soon, the country would descend into civil war as it did following the Soviet pullout in 1989.

Among many Iraqis is the sense that the US is leaving with the job there unfinished, and not only in terms of security.  As Stephen Lee Myers reports in the NY Times, the US is departing with the country's electrical grid - a major benchmark of progress - still a mess, with even the capital city getting only 5 hours a day.

That has generated disillusionment and dissent, including protests this summer that, while violent in two cases, were a different measure of Iraq’s new freedoms.

“Democracy didn’t bring us anything,” Mr. Farhan said in his newly darkened shop. Then he corrected himself. “Democracy brought us a can of Coke and a beer.”

The overall legacy of the American invasion today, like that of the war itself, remains a matter of dispute, colored by ideology, politics and faith in democracy’s ultimate ability to take root in the heart of the Arab world.

Even Iraqis suspicious of American motives hoped that the overthrow of Saddam Hussein would bring modern, competent governance. Still, the streets are littered with trash, drinking water is polluted, hospitals are bleak and often unsafe, and buildings bombed by the Americans in 2003 or by insurgents since remain ruined shells.

What is clear is that Iraqis’ expectations of a reliable supply of electricity and other services, like their expectations of democracy itself, have exceeded what either Americans or the country’s quarrelling politicians have so far been able to meet.

It has been noted often that both Pakistanis and Afghans harbor a deep mistrust of the US because of the frequency with which the US has intervened in their affairs, then bugged out, abandoning them to civil war, dictatorship, and economic ruin.  It remains to be seen how Iraqis 20 years from now will feel about the US's "intervention" in 2003 and after, but at this point, all the signs point to a rerun of the Pakistani and Afghan experiences: a long-continuing, deep resentment after being abandoned.  If Iraqi politicians are able to reach some compromises, cobble together a working government, and create enough internal stability for the country to cash in on its oil wealth, perhaps Iraqis' long-term view of the US will improve.  Unfortunately, at this point in time, it seems just as likely that that won't happen.  Iraq seems destined to be mired in misery for the foreseeable future; and the US will be held responsible (and justifiably so).